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ARGUMENT 
I. Community Caretaking Function. 
In its Brief of Respondent, the State cites State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290 (Ct. App. 2003) 
in support of its assertion that the "emergency aid doctrine is encompassed within the community 
caretaking function, and has been applied to cases involving warrantless entries into homes." 
Brief of Respondent, p. 9. While the Court of Appeals in Barrett did state that the emergency 
aid doctrine is encompassed within the community caretaking function, the Court in Barrett did 
not base its decision on the officer's community caretaking function. Rather, the Court based its 
decision on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. Barrett, 138 Idaho at 295. The State has not cited any Idaho appellate opinion in 
which the community caretaking function has been applied to a police officer's warrantless entry 
into a citizen's home. This may be a matter of first impression in Idaho, which warrants a 
discussion of legal authority from other jurisdictions. 
The Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals 
have considered cases regarding the application of the community caretaking doctrine to the 
warrantless search of residential and commercial properties. Each court declined to extend the 
community caretaking function of law enforcement officers to allow warrantless searches of 
private homes or businesses. See Ray v. Township of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 177 (3 rd Cir. 2010) 
("The community caretaking doctrine cannot be used to justify warrantless searches of a 
home."); United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating, "we have 
never explicitly held that the community caretaking functions of a police officer permits the 
warrantless entry into a private home," and holding that officers' warrantless entry was not 
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objectively reasonable when it was not justified by any compelling exigency); United States v. 
Bute, 43 F.3d 531 (10th Cir. 1994) (refusing to extend community caretaking function to 
warrantless search of commercial garage); United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 
1993) (refusing to extend community caretaking function to warrantless search of private home); 
United States v. Pichany, 687 F .2d 204 (7th Cir.1982) (refusing to extend community caretaking 
function to warrantless search of warehouse). 
State v. Gill, 755 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 2008), is factually very similar to the current case, 
and therefore a recitation of the facts in Gill is appropriate. In Gill, 
[A] passerby witnessed and reported a car accident the afternoon of 
December 2, 2006. The state radio dispatched that a vehicle went in a ditch and 
struck a tree. The dispatch said it was unknown whether any injuries resulted from 
the crash. Two officers responded to the dispatch. 
The first officer to arrive at the scene testified that it appeared the vehicle 
left the roadway, went in the snowy ditch, was airborne for a short distance, 
traveled up an embankment, and struck a tree. The vehicle's driver appeared to 
have attempted to get back on the road, but the vehicle was unable to reenter the 
roadway because there was too much snow. Nobody was at the scene when the 
officer arrived. The officer ran the vehicle's registration. The license plates did not 
match the vehicle. 
The passerby returned to the scene and spoke to the officer. The officer 
testified that the passerby indicated he witnessed the vehicle driving from 
shoulder to shoulder at forty-five degree angles before it went in the ditch; he 
pulled to the shoulder of the road because he was scared the vehicle was going to 
strike his vehicle; he observed one male occupant in the vehicle and someone who 
picked up the occupant in a two-tone Dodge pickup and left the scene. 
Another officer arrived on the scene. The officers began investigating 
nearby farmhouses. They saw a farm with a two-tone Dodge pickup in the yard. 
They entered the yard and spoke to an individual who said her husband had given 
their neighbor a ride home earlier in the evening. She pointed the officers toward 
Gill's farmstead. 
The officers drove to Gill's farmstead. They observed a light on in the 
house and pounded on the door for several minutes. Nobody answered the door. 
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They walked past a picture window and could see what appeared to be a male 
sitting in a chair. They could only see the top of the individual's head from the 
window because of how the chair was situated. They started knocking on the 
window, then began pounding on the window when they received no response. 
The officers testified that they pounded on the window so hard they were 
concerned the window might break. The person in the chair was not moving at all. 
One of the officers called their supervisor and advised him of the situation. About 
one and one-half hours had passed from the time of the initial accident. The 
officers testified that they were concerned for the individual's welfare and 
received permission from their supervisor to enter the residence and check on the 
welfare of the individual. 
The officers testified that they went to the front door, entered the house, 
and said something along the lines of, "is anybody home?" and "hello, hello, 
anybody there?" They entered the room where the individual was sitting in the 
chair. They shook him several times before he became conscious. They noticed an 
extremely strong odor of alcoholic beverages. The officers testified that they 
asked Gill if he had been drinking. Gill said he blew a tire and went in the ditch. 
755 N.W.2d at 456 - 457. 
Gill was charged with driving under the influence, driving without privileges, and 
unlawful display of license plate or tab. 755 N.W.2d at 455. Gill filed a motion to suppress, 
asserting that any and all evidence gathered from and after the officers' entry into his home 
should be suppressed because the evidence was obtained unlawfully. Id. at 458. The trial court 
denied Gill's motion to suppress, finding that the entry was justified as performance of the 
officers' community caretaking function. Id. at 457. The case proceeded to trial, and Gill was 
found guilty of all three charges. Id. Gill appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. 
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the community caretaking 
doctrine was inapplicable to Gill's case because the scope of an officer's community caretaking 
function does not encompass a dwelling place. 755 N.W.2d at 455. The court "decline[d] to 
extend the scope of the community caretaking doctrine to include officers' entry into private 
residences." Id. at 459. Citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), the court referred to 
the previous "recognition of the distinction between motor vehicles and dwelling places." Id. at 
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460. The court declined to consider whether the entry into Gill's home was justified under the 
emergency doctrine, because the state raised that ground for the first time on appeal. 
It is apparent that the warrant exceptions "community caretaking function", "emergency 
aid doctrine", "emergency doctrine", and even "exigent circumstances" have been used 
somewhat interchangeably by various courts, leading to a certain amount of confusion. In State 
V. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 2009), the South Dakota Supreme Court analyzed the 
distinction between these different doctrines: 
A review of the case law reveals a breadth of decisions discussing and 
applying various exceptions including the emergency doctrine, the emergency aid 
doctrine, and the community caretaker doctrine. 
Some of the avowed distinctions between these three doctrines can be frail, 
bordering on the meaningless. Neither have they been consistently applied, thus 
creating contradictory and sometimes conflicting doctrines. Some courts treat 
these exceptions interchangeably. Others declare that the community caretaker 
exception applies, but then use law applicable to one of the other exceptions, such 
as the emergency doctrine. Several courts have also held that the emergency aid 
doctrine is a subcategory of the community caretaker exception, while the 
, 
emergency doctrine is a subcategory of the exigent circumstances exception. 
775 N.W.2d at 232. 
Regarding the community caretaking doctrine, the South Dakota Supreme Court 
recognized that "[i]n several other jurisdictions, this exception has not easily evolved into an 
exception applicable to homes. In fact, the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as 
North Dakota, have declined to extend the community caretaker exception to residential entries 
because the Cady decision stressed the distinction between vehicles and dwellings." Id. at 236. 
After a review of appellate opinions from several states, the Court concluded that 
[I]t appears that the emergency aid doctrine differs from the community 
caretaker exception in part on the fact that the title, emergency aid doctrine, 
presumes an existing emergency to warrant the intrusion. Otherwise, this 
doctrine, like the community caretaker exception, requires reasonableness on the 
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part of the officers and circumstances warranting the intrusion. We agree with 
those courts holding that no useful distinction can be made between the 
emergency doctrine and the emergency aid doctrine. Both require, at their 
essence, an emergency. 
775 N.W.2d at 235. 
The South Dakota Supreme Court further found that the community caretaker exception 
has been recognized only in the context of automobiles by the United States Supreme Court, 
citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). Id. at 235. 
II. Emergency Aid Doctrine. 
If the emergency aid doctrine is encompassed within the community caretaking function, 
the question then arises as to whether the emergency aid doctrine can be analyzed as a separate, 
stand-alone ground to justify the entry into Ms. Posey's home. It is Ms. Posey's assertion that it 
cannot. However, in the event the Court should view it as a separate ground upon which the 
entry into Ms. Posey's home could be justified, Ms. Posey submits the following argument under 
the emergency aid doctrine. 
In Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that an officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant, and that an action is "reasonable" under 
the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, "as long as the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action." 547 U.S. at 404. (Citation omitted.) 
(Emphasis in original.) In United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals adopted a two-pronged test that asks whether: (1) considering the totality of the 
circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there 
was an immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious harm; and (2) the search's 
scope and manner were reasonable to meet the need. 515 F.3d at 952. 
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The State cites State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432 (et. App. 1996) and Brigham City, Utah v. 
Stuart, supra, in support of its argument that the emergency aid doctrine justified Officer 
Avriett's forced entry into Ms. Posey's home. However, both of these cases involve acts of 
physical violence in progress, and are distinguishable. In Sailas, the police officer responded to 
a domestic dispute in progress. 129 Idaho at 433. When the officer approached the apartment 
building, she could hear yelling and screaming coming from the apartment. Id. The officer 
knocked on the door, and the female who answered the door had blood on her nose and hands. 
Id. The officer could see Sailas and a small child inside the apartment. Id. The argument 
between Sailas and the female was continuing, and Sailas was shouting and making threats of 
harm against the female, even though a police officer was present. Id. 
In Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, supra, police officers responded to a call regarding a 
loud party at a residence. 547 U.S. at 400 - 401. The officers heard shouting from inside. Id. at 
401. The officers entered the backyard, and saw-through a screen door and windows-an 
altercation taking place in the kitchen. Id. Four adults were attempting, with some difficulty, to 
restrain a juvenile. Id. The juvenile struck one of the adults in the face. Id. The officer 
observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink. Id. The other adults continued 
to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him up against a refrigerator with such force that the 
refrigerator began moving across the floor. Id. At this point, an officer opened the screen door 
and announced the officers' presence. Id. Amid the tumult, nobody noticed. Id. The officer 
entered the kitchen and again cried out, and as the occupants slowly became aware that the 
police were on the scene, the altercation ceased. 
In the current case, there was no physical violence in progress. Officer A vriett knew that 
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any injury Ms. Posey sustained was as the result of a motor vehicle collision, and that action on 
his part was not necessary to prevent further injury. In Sailas and Brigham City, the law 
enforcement officers saw the injured parties with their own eyes prior to entry into the 
residences, and entry into the residences was necessary in order to restore peace and prevent 
further physical injury. While Officer A vriett may reasonably rely on the information provided 
by the citizen bystander as to what the bystander had observed about Ms. Posey's physical 
condition, Officer A vriett was also aware of additional facts that put in context what the 
bystander told him: injuries to occupants of the vehicle that Ms. Posey collided with were 
minor; and Ms. Posey was physically capable of walking home from the crash scene, a distance 
of several blocks. 
It was not objectively reasonable for Officer Avriett to conclude from Ms. Posey's refusal 
to open the front door to him that Ms. Posey was injured and in need of immediate assistance. 
Ihis is particularly in light of Officer Avriett's own testimony at the suppression hearing that he 
"wasn't sure if the person was either trying to barricade the door or trying to open it themselves", 
Ir. p. 12, L. 20 - 21 1, and that Officer A vriett referred to past experiences when people want to 
hide from the police. Tr. p. 13, L. 8 10; L. 14 - 15. Even after forcibly breaking open the front 
door to Ms. Posey's house there were less intrusive means of determining Ms. Posey's physical 
condition short of barging into the home and grabbing her, such as asking the "elderly 
gentleman" Officer Avriett encountered about her condition. Tr. p. 13, L. 25; p. 14, L. 1. 
Instead of asking the elderly gentleman about Ms. Posey's condition, however, Officer A vriett 
asked him "where the female was that had come in the house." Tr. p. 14, L. 3 - 5. 
I Transcript of hearing on Posey's Motion to Suppress held on May 27, 2011. 
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CONCLUSION 
Officer A vriett' s forced entry into Posey's home was unlawful, because there is no 
exception to the warrant requirement that applies in this case. There is no Idaho appellate court 
opinion that has applied the community caretaking function to a police officer's entry into a 
home. While there is some split among the federal circuit courts on the issue, the majority of 
federal circuit courts who have ruled on the issue, including the 9th Circuit, have found that the 
community caretaking function is not applicable to entry into a home. In addition, at least two 
state supreme courts have made the same ruling. 
In addition, the State has not met its burden of establishing that (1) considering the 
totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding 
that there was an immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious harm; and (2) the 
search's scope and manner were reasonable to meet the need. Officer A vriett did not break in to 
the home out of concern for Posey's welfare. Officer A vriett was clearly attempting to 
apprehend Posey, whom he suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. Before entering 
Posey's home, however, Officer Avriett lacked probable cause to arrest Posey for the offense of 
driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Because the evidence that Posey was under the influence of alcohol was obtained as a 
direct result of exploitation of the illegal entry into her home, any evidence against Posey that 
was obtained after Officer Avriett broke into her home must be suppressed, pursuant to the 
exclusionary rule. 
DATED this ~ day of December, 2012. 
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